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PRELIMINARY PAPER ON THE LAW
OF PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS FROM SEIZURE
Thomas G. W. Telfer, University of Western Ontario.
Introduction*
[1] Across the country, there is a “wide disparity” among the various provincial and
territorial statutes that exempt a debtor’s property from seizure.1 Changing economic and
social conditions, rates of inflation, and the shift of population from rural to urban areas
have “stripped the specific exemptions of much of their significance” and reform is “long
overdue.”2 The proposal to include exemptions in Part 12 of the Uniform Civil
Enforcement Act provides an opportunity to review the principles that inform exemption
law.
[2] Part I of the paper examines the principles that inform provincial exemption law and
how courts have interpreted exemption statutes. Part II considers the various models of
exemption statutes that need to be considered when designing an appropriate exemption
regime. Part III offers a brief overview of the law of personal exemptions from seizure
and highlights the lack of uniformity and some of the idiosyncratic features of provincial
and territorial legislation. Part IV examines the relationship between secured credit and
exemptions. The paper concludes with Part V which addresses the implications of the
reform proposal to adopt a federal exemption list in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
This would represent a fundamental change as current bankruptcy law defers to
provincial legislation to set appropriate exemptions in the debtor’s bankruptcy.3 Given
space limitations, the paper does not provide a detailed analysis of each aspect of Part 12
of the proposed Uniform Civil Enforcement Act. Rather, the goal of the paper is to
highlight some of the key policy choices that are at stake in the design of a uniform
exemption statute.
I
Principles of Interpretation and the Purposes of Exemption Statutes
[3] Exemption from seizure is an exception created by law that restricts the rights of
creditors.4 Provincial and territorial exemption statutes modify the harsh results of the
common law that permitted the sheriff to seize and sell all the personal goods and chattels
of the debtor that could be found and sold, with the exception of wearing apparel in
actual use.5 As exemption statutes are a derogation of the common law rights of creditors
there is a line of case law that has adopted the principle that such exemption statutes
should be construed strictly.6 However, there is a competing line of cases which
concludes that exemption statutes are remedial and are to be given a liberal interpretation
to protect the debtor.7 This latter principle derives support from a large number of cases
that refer to the general purpose of exemption law.8 However, courts will not always
correct legislative oversight or update an exemption statute by relying upon the broad
underlying principles of exemption law.9 In some instances the plain reading of a statute
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has taken precedence over a purposive interpretation even where the plain reading
deprives a debtor of an exemption.
[4] Although early western exemption statutes were designed in part to attract settlers,
more recent exemption statutes focus on the more general purpose of protecting the
debtor and the debtor’s family by preserving some minimum level of subsistence and
dignity.10 Professor Dunlop argues that “[i]t is not acceptable that creditors, no matter
how just the debt, should have the power to take from debtors the basic necessities of
life.”11 Exemption statutes permit the debtor to retain some essentials or what has been
called the “basics of life while making the bulk of his or her assets available to satisfy
judgment creditors.”12 In a 2001 report, Modernization of Saskatchewan Money
Judgment Enforcement Law, Professors Buckwold and Cuming recognized that beyond
maintaining “a subsistence standard of living” exemption law should also permit a debtor
and a debtor’s family “to function as healthy, productive and contributing members of
society.” This broader rationale might justify a wider scope of necessities that are related
to the reasonable educational, health and recreational needs of the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents. Under the Saskatchewan proposal a motor vehicle exemption might be
sought where it would accommodate “children’s participation in sports, musical and other
artistic or cultural programs.”13
[5] Under the general category of necessities many exemption statutes include such items
as household furniture, wearing apparel, food and fuel with some jurisdictions
recognizing a motor vehicle as a basic necessity up to a fixed dollar amount. Separate
legislation in some jurisdictions also includes burial plots and monies paid into a pre-paid
funeral plan.14 A debtor’s basic necessity may also include shelter and some jurisdictions
provide some form of exemption for residential property. The basis for a personal
residence exemption is discussed below in Part V. Provincial legislation also extends to
matters of life insurance, pensions, and wage garnishment. This report focuses on the
various ways provincial legislation exempts tangible personal property and real property
from seizure.
[6] Exemptions also preserve the means for debtors to “survive and to earn a living, thus
contributing to their rehabilitation as citizens and to their capacity to repay their debts.”15
The Ontario Law Reform Commission concluded that it was of great importance to leave
the debtor “with the wherewithal to work in the community and earn a decent living.”16
Under this second goal, exemption statutes protect items of personal property, such as
tools of trade or agricultural implements, which are important to the debtor’s livelihood.
In some provinces farm land is also protected.
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[7] In addition, preserving the economic vitality of the debtor has been justified from the
broader perspective of the public interest. If creditors were permitted to “destroy debtors’
economic viability, their continued maintenance would fall to society.”17 Debtors should
not be “cast upon the community with nothing, penniless with the likelihood of becoming
a public charge.”18 Finally, exemption statutes minimize the judgment debtor’s loss that
may occur through forced execution sales. Such a sale would offer little return to the
creditors, yet it may impose considerable hardship on the debtor.19 Some provincial
statutes protect items of sentimental value.
[8] The above policies of exemption law relate to a debtor as an individual and not to
corporate entities.20 Many provincial exemption statutes expressly indicate that the
exemptions are only available to a natural person.21 However, proposals contained in the
2001 Saskatchewan Money Judgments Report and the Draft Uniform Civil Enforcement
Act recognize that a small closely held corporation “may in reality be nothing more than
an individual using an incorporated form of business organization.”22 The Draft Uniform
Civil Enforcement Act, subject to specific limitations, would enable an individual
holding a controlling interest in a corporation to exempt property owned by the corporate
debtor.23 This would represent a fundamental change in the law. Balanced against the
need to ignore formal legal structures are concerns whether appropriate and clear
limitations can be included which will guard against abuse and avoid the problem of a
thinly capitalized corporation. Furthermore, incorporation affords the benefit of limited
liability to the principals of the company and it is relevant to ask whether those principals
should also obtain the benefits of exemptions.24
[9] Although there appears to be a general consensus about the general aims of exemption
law, there is also recognition that any regime must balance the interests of both debtors
and creditors.25 The Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1981 Report recognized that
while “exemptions must be fair, we must not lose sight of the fact that the debtor has a
legal obligation to repay his debts within a reasonable period of time.”26 Creditors may
find themselves in financial difficulty as a result of having to forego their rights.27 The
Manitoba Law Reform Commission pointed out that “it must be remembered that, by
definition, a judgment creditor has been found by a court to be owed a sum by the
judgment debtor” and it is the creditor that must be regarded as the “aggrieved party”
until the debt has been paid.28 The challenge lies in achieving the proper balance between
debtor and creditor interests by defining the modest and dignified lifestyle in the form of
specific legislation.
II
Models of Exemption Statutes
[10] In designing exemption statutes, legislators have traditionally adopted a paternalistic
view by wanting to define “what values are important to their society and to impose those
3
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values on debtors who are apparently seen as incapable of choosing well for
themselves.”29 Thus most exemption statutes seek to define categories of exempt property
as opposed to granting a debtor a lump sum amount from which any property might be
selected. These two competing models are discussed below.
A) Specific Lists
[11] Traditional exemption statutes provided very detailed and lengthy lists of exempt
property. For example, the 1887 Ontario Execution Act enabled a debtor to retain a long
list of items including one coal scuttle, one washboard, three smoothing irons, all
spinning wheels, one gun and six traps. The list also specified how many plates, tea pots
and specific items of cutlery were exempt from seizure.30 Most jurisdictions have
abandoned these specific lists in favour of more general or selective categories. However,
as demonstrated below in Part III, not all idiosyncratic lists have been eliminated.
Remnants of a province’s agricultural past still affect current law.
[12] Specific exemption lists, while providing certainty, are at risk of becoming obsolete
when the listed articles are no longer a necessity in the debtor’s life.31 It would be an
endless task to anticipate all forms of personal property that might be listed as exempt in
provincial legislation.32 However, not all specific exemptions are anachronistic or out of
date. A specific exemption may also reflect a general consensus that a particular item is a
basic necessity. Several provinces have listed a motor vehicle up to a monetary amount as
exempt property.
B) Selective Lists
[13] A more modern method used in provincial exemption statutes is to provide a
selective list or general category of exempt property. Provincial exemption statutes
provide an exemption for unspecified necessary tools used in the debtor’s trade or the
general category of household furnishings. A more general category is unlikely to
become obsolete, as the broad nature of the exemption will incorporate new types of
chattels as they become either a basic necessity or necessary to the debtor’s livelihood.33
C) Limitations on Specific or Selective Lists
[14] Given the wide range of values of property that might fall within a specific or
selective list, statutes seek to qualify these exemptions either with a dollar amount and/or
a limitation focusing on the necessity of the item. In Ontario, “necessary and ordinary
wearing apparel” of the debtor is exempt up to $5000. If no monetary cap is set an
exemption is typically limited by some defined notion of necessity. The Saskatchewan
Money Judgment Report described this more open ended standard as a test of functional
adequacy. For example, the Saskatchewan Report recommended that the debtor be able to
retain “household furnishings necessary to allow the judgment debtor and the judgment
debtor’s family and dependents to maintain a functional household.”34
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[15] There are inherent problems with the specific lists, monetary caps, and more open
ended tests of necessity or function. These are typical problems associated with fixed
rules and open ended standards.35 The choice is how best to balance the certainty of
fixed rules with appropriate open ended standards. While a fixed rule will have the
advantage of providing certainty and reduced litigation, it is unable to accommodate
individual circumstances in a flexible way. Specific lists and monetary caps may become
obsolete as the debtors’ needs or economic conditions change over time. Many
jurisdictions do not have any mechanism which provides for an automatic updating of the
monetary amounts.36
[16] In contrast, a more open ended standard that requires interpretation on a case by case
basis is capable of adapting to the individual circumstances and needs of the parties.
Given that it is unlikely that all jurisdictions will agree to the same fixed values for each
category of property, it might seem that the best hope for a uniform statute lies with
selective lists tied to some general standard or functional test of necessity without
monetary limits. An important question is whether such a uniform statute containing
broad standards is capable of being applied in a uniform way. Standards are likely to
involve increased litigation costs and are at risk of being inconsistently interpreted over
time and in different regions. Ambiguous or vague provisions may lead to “inequality of
treatment of debtors and their creditors where sheriffs take differing views of the law.”37
Indeed, there has been a great deal of case law on what is a necessary or required tool of
trade with differing views on whether the provision should be interpreted in a broad or
narrow manner.38 Even when a court intervenes to interpret an open ended standard the
guidance itself may not offer any more certainty.39
D) Lump Sums
[17] An alternative model abandons any attempt to generally or specifically describe
categories of exempt property that will form the debtor’s basic necessities or the property
required to earn an income. Debtors, rather than the state, may be in a better position to
know and understand what specific items of property will be essential to their own
rehabilitation.40 This approach favours a more individualized discretionary regime by
granting debtors a lump sum exemption.41
[18] A lump sum approach provides a debtor with the right to select any description of
goods and chattels up to a specified monetary sum.42 There are several advantages to
such an approach that go beyond the inherent flexibility of the regime. As long as the
dollar amount is kept current there is no danger that the exemption will become obsolete.
A lump sum approach avoids interpretive questions of necessity that are common with
tool of trade or agricultural implements.43
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[19] Although a lump sum approach offers the possibility of giving the debtor freedom to
select items, it has not found acceptance in Canadian law.44 Legislators may mistrust
debtors’ ability to choose wisely and prefer a paternalistic approach of identifying the
types of property that a debtor should preserve.45 A lump sum approach may not actually
fulfill the policy of exemption law. In some instances a debtor may fail to choose the
very basic necessities or items required to earn a livelihood.46
[20] The benefits of the “complete individualization of exemptions” may be outweighed
by the costs of such a regime.47 This model “requires an appraisal of all of the
individual’s property whenever a creditor makes a levy on any of the debtor’s individual
property” and was rejected by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) in its Uniform Exemption Act.48 Further, a lump sum approach,
while appearing flexible, might be too generous “for a labourer owning no tools of his
own but too limited for a self employed plumber or farmer who has to have expensive
equipment.”49 Finally, a lump sum approach offers little prospects for uniformity. It is
unlikely that all jurisdictions would agree to a uniform sum.
E) Wild Cards and Spillovers
[21] If lump sums are not acceptable is there an alternative mechanism to address the
concern that selective or specific lists discriminate against debtors that have failed to
acquire the types of assets listed in an exemption statute?50 A variation of a lump sum
approach is to adopt, what has become known in the United States as a “wild card
exemption”51 which is an exemption not tied to “a particular form of property.”52 Several
states permit a debtor an additional wild card exemption for any property up to a fixed
amount beyond the listed categories. The US Bankruptcy Code enumerates various types
of exemptions and then additionally allows a debtor to retain his or her “aggregate
interest in any property” not to exceed in value $925.53 To address the potential for
discrimination against non-home owners some US exemption statutes go further and
provide to the non-home owner an additional wildcard exemption.54 The US Bankruptcy
Code, in addition to the $925 wildcard exemption noted above, enables a debtor to retain
up to $9250 “of any unused amount” of the debtor’s residential property exemption.55
[22] A wild card exemption might be used to increase the total value of exempt assets in
an enumerated category. This “corrects the imbalance by allowing the debtor to use the
unused portion of his home exemption to raise the ceilings on the car, [or] household
exemptions.”56 This is known as a “spill over” exemption. For example, if a statute
limited a debtor to a $10,000 tool of trade exemption, he or she may be able to claim
additional tools of trade beyond that limit by relying on an available wild card
exemption.57 However, “any property” has been interpreted liberally leaving the debtor
free to select additional property from existing categories of exempt property as well as
property that does not fall within the scope of an enumerated list.58
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F) An Alternative Discretionary Approach
[23] Rather than granting a debtor a wild card exemption, a statute might include some
additional discretionary powers to take into account the debtor’s individual
circumstances. In New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and PEI a secured party is prohibited
from seizing consumer goods, if the court determines that the “loss of the consumer
goods would cause serious hardship to the debtor or dependent or the costs of seizing and
selling the goods would be disproportionate to the value seized.”59 A more specific form
of discretion, which might allow a debtor to seek protection for an exemption beyond the
maximum prescribed limit, is contemplated in the Draft Uniform Civil Enforcement Act
submitted by the Working Group. Where a jurisdiction sets a maximum amount for a
personal residential exemption, section 163/206(2) of the Draft Act permits the debtor or
debtor’s dependents to make an application to the court to declare a principal residence
exempt until a further order of the court. A court must be satisfied that the prescribed
amount “will not enable a judgment debtor and his or her dependents to have a minimally
reasonable standard of residential accommodation” or “disposition of the property in an
enforcement proceeding will cause serious hardship to a judgment debtor or his or her
dependents.”60
III

Overview of Provincial and Territorial Exemptions
A) Property Required for Basic Necessities
[24] Although there may be a general consensus that the law must protect the debtor’s
basic necessities, there is considerable variation in the ways in which legislation limits
this category.61 The few reported cases on subsistence assets suggest that it will be
relatively rare that parties will litigate over low cost items.62 While these items may be of
little monetary value to creditors, they obviously have great value and importance to the
debtor and his or her family.
i) Food and Fuel63
[25] All provinces and territories, but for British Columbia, provide an express provision
for some amount of food for the debtor and dependents. “Required” or “necessary” food
for the debtor and the debtor’s family are limited by a specified time period in Alberta
(12 months), Manitoba (6 months), New Brunswick (3 months), Newfoundland and
Labradour (12 months), Northwest Territories (12 months) and Yukon (12 months).
[26] Other provinces limit the exemption not by time period but by what is functionally
equivalent to necessary food. In Nova Scotia, “all fuel and food reasonably necessary for
the ordinary use of the family” is exempt. A number of provinces combine the food
exemption with other categories of essential items such as fuel which is limited either by
a time period or the more general limitation of what is reasonably necessary.64 There is
no express protection of fuel in British Columbia and Alberta.
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[27] The Saskatchewan Exemptions Act reflects its agricultural roots and offers a unique
rural approach to the protection of food and fuel. In Saskatchewan the following is
declared free from seizure:
grain, flour, vegetables and meat, whether prepared for use or on foot, or any of
them, sufficient when converted into cash to provide food and fuel for heating
purposes for the execution debtor and his family until the next ensuing harvest.65
[28] Both Ontario and PEI combine food and fuel in the same provision with other
essential items such as household furniture, utensils and equipment and impose a
monetary cap for the listed items (Ontario $10,000; PEI $2000).66 The inclusion of fuel as
exempt property perhaps reflects a time when many debtors purchased their own supply
of coal. If fuel is to remain a more realistic exemption would cover the “cost of fuel” for
a specified period.67
ii) Clothing68
[29] Every jurisdiction in Canada recognizes a form of exemption for clothing or wearing
apparel of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents. Most jurisdictions simply qualify or
limit this category by what is necessary or ordinary and do not impose any monetary
limit. In contrast, three provinces impose a monetary cap on necessary clothing: Alberta
($4000), Ontario ($5000) and Newfoundland and Labradour ($4000).
iii) Household Furnishings69
[30] All provinces and territories have abandoned itemized lists of household property in
favour of a more general category of household furnishings and appliances. However,
there is no uniform approach to limiting this category. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
enable the debtor to retain “furniture, household furnishings and appliances reasonably
necessary for the debtor and his family” of no particular fixed value.70 Manitoba ($4500)
and Quebec ($6000) combine a dollar amount with a form of a reasonably necessary
standard.71
[31] In contrast a number of provinces simply fix a dollar amount without imposing any
requirement of proof of necessity. British Columbia, Alberta, and Newfoundland and
Labrador enable a debtor to retain household furnishings and appliances to a value
totaling $4000 whereas Saskatchewan has set the limit at $4500.72 Ontario ($10,000),
PEI ($2000), Northwest Territories ($200) and Yukon ($200) also impose a dollar cap but
additionally require that the household furniture be “contained in and form part of the
permanent home.”
iv) Sentimental value items73
[32] Items of sentimental value pose a particular problem in balancing the interests of
debtors and creditors if one fixes a monetary cap. Wedding rings or family heirlooms
may be irreplaceable and at the same time be of high market value. A debtor may seek to
shelter an asset behind a sentimental claim which may deprive a creditor of a valuable
asset.74 However, in those jurisdictions that protect sentimental property the emphasis has
8
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been to protect items of high sentimental value that will not necessarily be of high market
value. Such provisions acknowledge that “the removal of such property in enforcement
proceedings would be heartless when its intrinsic value to the debtor is far greater than
the amount that will be realized by the creditors.”75 Although it might be rare for a
creditor to seize items that are of high religious or sentimental value to the debtor, such
provisions protect against the possibility of the threats of seizure and resulting hardship
that would be imposed on the debtor and his or her family.76
[33] In Manitoba “articles and furniture necessary to the performance of religious
services” are exempt from seizure. Similarly in Quebec, “consecrated vessels and things
used for religious worship” are exempt as well as “family papers and portraits, medals
and other decorations.” Newfoundland and Labrador offer a more general exemption for
“items of sentimental value” but cap the value at $500. New Brunswick and
Newfoundland and Labrador also provide a separate exemption for pets.
v) Medical Aids77
[34] Seven provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador) have included a form of a “required” or
“reasonably necessary” medical aid of no fixed amount as part of their basic exemption
statute.78 Such exemptions sustain the debtor’s health but some jurisdictions acknowledge
that the medical aid may assist the debtor in employment or trade.79 Most jurisdictions
opt for a more general phrase of “medical and dental aids” while Manitoba provides an
illustrative list of health aids such as “a wheelchair, an air-conditioner, an elevator, a
hearing aid, eye glasses and prosthetic or orthopedic equipment”.80
[35] In the absence of a specific medical aid exemption in the Saskatchewan Exemptions
Act, a quadriplegic in Re Guest81 claimed a specially equipped motor vehicle under the
general motor vehicle provision. In Saskatchewan a motor vehicle will be exempt if it is
“necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the execution debtor's business, trade,
calling or profession.” The bankrupt survived on disability benefits and volunteered for
the local health authority. He used the van to provide rides to shut-ins with disabilities
and to deliver groceries and toiletries to individuals with disabilities.
[36] As the bankrupt was not employed and did not have an occupation, profession, trade
or business for which he received payment the court denied the claim. The court
recognized that the provincial legislation had not kept pace with medical advances
designed to enable quadriplegics to “become independent and valued members of
society.”82 The court acknowledged that in the absence of a specific exemption for a
medical aid the decision deprived the bankrupt of an asset which ensured his
independence.83
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vi) Motor Vehicles
[37] Traditionally, if a debtor wanted to claim a motor vehicle as exempt property many
statutes required the motor vehicle to be linked to the debtor’s livelihood. More recently
several provinces have amended their exemption statutes to acknowledge that a motor
vehicle is a basic necessity.84 Under this approach any debtor owning a motor vehicle has
the ability to claim an exemption whether or not the vehicle is used in the debtor’s trade,
business or occupation.85 Several provinces have motor vehicle exemptions with a set
monetary amount: British Columbia ($5000), Alberta ($5000),86 Ontario ($5000), Nova
Scotia ($3000), PEI ($3000), Newfoundland and Labradour ($2000).87
[38] The fact that three jurisdictions have selected $5000 as the upper limit suggests a
degree of uniformity. However, there are two distinct views on whether a debtor is
entitled to claim the dollar value up to the monetary limit as exempt where the value of
the motor vehicle exceeds the limit. Under current case law, where a car is valued at more
than $5000, a debtor in Alberta will be entitled to keep $5000 as exempt property while a
debtor in Ontario will not be entitled to an exemption for any of the proceeds from the
sale of the motor vehicle.88
[39] The Alberta approach recognizes that a monetary limit ensures that a debtor does not
shelter a more expensive car than is reasonably necessary. However, allowing the debtor
to claim an exemption for the value up to the monetary limit is still justifiable. If a debtor
is denied an exemption where the car is worth more than the monetary limit, there will
not be “any opportunity to buy a more modest vehicle after a seizure has occurred.”89 The
Alberta Law Reform Institute in 1991 recommended that a debtor be entitled to claim an
exemption for the prescribed monetary amount even where the value of the vehicle
exceeded the set amount. This recommendation was adopted in the Alberta Civil
Enforcement Act and endorsed by Re Pearson.90 This approach also avoids valuation
disputes which will become crucial in the all or nothing approach currently in place in
Ontario.
[40] The Ontario Execution Act includes an exemption for “a motor vehicle not
exceeding…$5000.”91 Although the excess value issue had been debated and resolved in
Alberta it appears that this matter was not considered when the Ontario Execution Act
was amended in 2001. Earlier this year, in Re Fields92 the Ontario Court of Appeal
examined this provision in light of a motor vehicle valued at $11,000. The Court held that
the entire value of the vehicle was not exempt.
[41] The Court of Appeal accepted that the purpose of exemptions was to “allow a debtor
to retain the basics of life.” From a public policy perspective, the Court acknowledged
that the interpretation of the statute that would have provided the debtor with a $5000
exemption was “compelling”.93 To allow a debtor $5000 would “give the section the
10
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interpretation that makes most common sense, would be most helpful to debtors and
would fit with the intent and purpose of the philosophy of exemptions.” The Court noted
that whereas s. 4 of the Ontario Execution Act contemplated that the debtor was entitled
to receive up to the monetary limit for other categories of personal property exceeding
those limits, motor vehicles were not listed in that provision. In the end Feldman J.A.
concluded that the failure to amend s. 4 when the motor vehicle provision was added was
likely an “oversight.” If it was such an oversight, “it is only the legislature and not the
court that can make the correction.”94
[42] Not all exemption statutes recognize a motor vehicle as a basic necessity. Manitoba,
New Brunswick and Saskatchewan have retained the traditional approach by requiring
that the vehicle be required for earning a livelihood.95 While New Brunswick and
Manitoba cap this exemption at $3000, in Saskatchewan a non farmer debtor may claim a
motor vehicle of no set value “necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the
execution debtor’s business, trade calling or profession.”96 Although Quebec, Yukon, and
Northwest Territories do not include any express motor vehicle exemption, a debtor
might succeed in making a claim under the more general category of tools of trade.97
[43] In those jurisdictions where a debtor must establish a link between a motor vehicle
and a livelihood, the debtor may find that alleging a need for transportation to work is not
enough. The test of a necessary vehicle for a debtor’s livelihood does not automatically
entitle the debtor to travel in his or her own motor vehicle to work. It has been held that
alternatives such as renting, using public transit and taxis achieve the same result without
prejudicing creditors. 98
B) Property Required for the Debtor’s Livelihood
[44] Apart from preserving basic necessities, exemption statutes also focus on assets that
enable the debtor to earn a livelihood.99 In some instances the tools of trade exemption
may reflect the province’s economic history. Thus one finds “one cross plough…one
horse rake…and one seed drill” in early Alberta legislation100 and “fishing nets” in early
Nova Scotia legislation.101 Earlier efforts to restrict tools of trade to items required for
manual work have in many instances been overcome by case law and amendments to
legislation which now contemplate a broader range of occupations, trade, business,
calling or profession as well as recognizing a motor vehicle as a possible tool of trade. 102
However, as discussed below not all evidence of a province’s earlier economic history
has been removed from the statutes.
i) Tools of Trade Non Farmer
[45] The infinite variety of occupations and associated tools makes it impossible to
precisely list specific types of exempt property103 and many jurisdictions have opted to
use more general language.104 Ontario for example, exempts “tools and instruments and
11
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other chattels ordinarily used by the debtor in the debtor's business, profession or
calling.” In some instances, the antiquated term “tools” or “tools of trade” has been
dropped in favour of an even more general approach. For example, in Alberta a nonfarming debtor may retain “personal property” used to earn income from the debtor’s
occupation up to the value of $10,000.105
[46] Five jurisdictions have chosen $10,000 for the upper limit of this category (Alberta,
British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario). Beyond these jurisdictions,
there is little agreement on what is an appropriate cap ($7,500 Manitoba; $6,500 New
Brunswick; $4,500 Saskatchewan; $2,000 PEI; $ 1,000 Nova Scotia; $600 combined with
agricultural exemption: Yukon and Northwest Territories). Quebec exempts “the
instruments of work needed for the personal exercise of his professional activity” with no
specific monetary limit.
ii) Agricultural and fishing exemptions
[47] Many regions have adopted separate occupational exemptions specific to agriculture
or fishing. A relevant question is whether the current provisions continue to reflect the
importance of the agricultural and fishing industry to a geographic region or whether they
are more “closely related to the cultural and economic history of a province/territory.”106
The cyclical nature of farming operations and the higher costs of agricultural equipment
are typical justifications given for these unique exemptions. However, a non farming
debtor engaged in business operations may also incur cyclical periods of success and
decline and utilize high cost equipment.107 The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law in its Model Uniform Exemption Act chose not to single out
farmers for special treatment.108
[48] There is little uniformity on the need for or scope of agricultural exemptions. At one
end of the spectrum British Columbia and Quebec offer no separate or unique agricultural
exemption in their main statute. In contrast many jurisdictions have incorporated various
agricultural exemptions. In Saskatchewan, for example, specific legislation exempts
several general categories of agricultural items including livestock, farm machinery and
equipment, books, tools, seed grain and crops.109
[49] There are several instances where provinces have retained very specific lists rather
than more general categories of agricultural items. For example, in New Brunswick a
debtor may claim an exemption of “two horses and sets of harness, two cows, ten sheep,
two hogs and twenty fowl” without any need to show that the items are necessary or are
reasonably required.110 The New Brunswick statute also exempts “seed grain and
potatoes required for seeding and planting purposes to the following quantities: forty
bushels of oats, ten bushels of barley, ten bushels of buckwheat, ten bushels of wheat and
thirty-five barrels of potatoes.”
12
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[50] The Ontario Execution Act continues to exempt livestock, fowl, bees, seed for 100
acres, and 14 bushels of potatoes as well as the more general categories of books, tools
and implements associated with the “tillage of the soil” or farming. In addition, where
seizure is made between October 1 and April 30, the Execution Act also exempts “such
food and bedding as are necessary to feed and bed the livestock and fowl” until the 30th
day of April next following.
[51] Whereas Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba limit agricultural equipment to those
items necessary for a particular fixed time period, other jurisdictions cap this category
with a dollar amount ($25,000 Ontario; Newfoundland and Labradour $10,000; Prince
Edward Island $5000; Nova Scotia $1000, Northwest Territories and Yukon $600
combined with more general tool of trade).
[52] Quebec, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador have enacted exemptions
specific to fishing. In Quebec a debtor’s “fishing boats and equipment cannot be seized or
sold between May 1 and November 1.” In Nova Scotia “fishing nets” are specifically
included in the more general list of “farm equipment and tools and implements” used in
the debtor’s chief occupation. This entire list is exempt to the value of $1000. In
Newfoundland and Labrador, where a debtor’s primary occupation is fishing or
aquaculture, a debtor may claim personal property used by and necessary for the debtor
to earn an income in that occupation to the value of $10,000. The absence of a specific
fishing equipment exemption in other jurisdictions does not preclude a debtor from
claiming an exemption under the more general tools of trade provisions.111
C) Homestead and Personal Residence Exemptions
[53] Beyond items of personal property, some provinces allow debtors to claim an
exemption for land and residential dwelling and these provisions can be traced back to
the efforts of the western provinces to encourage settlement112 and to ensure that “as
much land should be brought and kept under cultivation as possible.”113 The homestead
exemption, as it became known, preserved the farmer’s personal residence and land up to
a specified maximum. In the 1910 case of Re Hetherington, Lamont J. identified the
underlying policy behind the homestead exemption:
The leading and fundamental idea connected with a homestead is,
unquestionably, associated with that of a place of residence for a family,
where the independence and security of a home may be enjoyed without
the danger of loss, harassment or disturbance by reason of the
improvidence of the head or other member of the family. It is a secure
asylum, of which the family cannot be deprived by creditors….The
purpose of the Exemptions Ordinance being to preserve to the debtor and
his family a home in which they can dwell without risk of disturbance
from creditors….114
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[54] The inclusion of land in early Western homestead exemption legislation was
designed to ensure that farmers had some means of livelihood to support themselves and
their families.115 For the urban dweller, some provinces have enacted a separate
residential property exemption. However, there are two distinct attitudes on this issue.
While some western provinces offer, by Canadian standards, generous exemptions for a
homestead or a personal residence, Ontario and some Atlantic provinces offer no
exemption for residential property.
i) Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta
[55] Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta all offer separate exemptions for farm land and
residential property.116 In Alberta, where the debtor’s primary occupation is farming up
to 160 acres of land is exempt if the enforcement debtor’s principal residence is located
on that land and the land is part of the debtor’s farm.117 In Alberta, a debtor may claim a
principal residence exemption up to $40,000. In Manitoba, farm land of not more than
160 acres is exempt provided that it is “farm land upon which the judgment debtor or his
family actually resides or which he cultivates, either wholly or in part, or which he
actually uses for grazing or other purposes.” Manitoba legislation also protects the house,
stables, barns, and fences, on the judgment debtor’s farm. Non farmers in Manitoba
debtors are entitled to a $2500 personal residence exemption. In Saskatchewan, the
debtor’s house and buildings occupied by the debtor and the lots on which they are
located are exempt to the extent of $32,000.118 The Saskatchewan Exemptions Act also
exempts the homestead provided it is not more than 160 acres.119
ii) Other Jurisdictions
[56] Ontario and Nova Scotia do not provide any form of exemption for a personal
residence or land. In New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, there is no specific
exemption for a personal residence, and while land may be seized, it cannot be sold until
after the seizure and sale of all of a debtor’s personal estate.
[57] In addition to the three western provinces discussed above, British Columbia
($12,000 or $9000), Quebec ($10,000), Newfoundland and Labradour ($10,000), Yukon
($3000) and Northwest Territories ($3000) all provide some limited protection for the
debtor’s residential home. Apart from British Columbia, no province has attempted to
make a distinction between different housing markets within a province. Thus, debtors in
the Capital Regional District of Victoria and the Vancouver region are granted a $12,000
principal residence exemption whereas all other debtors in British Columbia only receive
a $9000 exemption.
iii) Farm Land and Shelter: Current Rationale?
[58] If the encouragement of settlement no longer justifies a homestead and residential
property exemption what current policy rationale supports the retention or addition of
such exemptions?120 First, to the extent that farm land is protected, a debtor’s ability to
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earn an income is preserved. Modern case law recognizes the importance of protecting
the livelihood of the farmer.121 If that is the case it remains relevant to ask whether the
160 acres in Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta is sufficient or indeed excessive to that
larger goal.122 The limit on the 160 acres provision is by size rather than by monetary
amount. This raises the question of whether an excessively valuable asset is being
protected from the claims of creditors.123
[59] The scope of the residential exemption depends upon how broadly one justifies the
rationale for exempting the debtor’s home. The residential property exemption at a bare
minimum can be justified as a preservation of the basic necessity of shelter.124 A debtor
should not be “left destitute, without a home”125 and such provisions protect the debtor
from “undue economic hardship, or perhaps more accurately, economic disaster, given
that the debtor’s home is at stake.”126 In order to preserve this basic necessity, the Ontario
Law Reform Commission recommended that debtors owning their own residences be
permitted to retain sufficient funds from the execution sale to secure rental
accommodation and to cover moving expenses.127 Anything beyond this minimum level
of subsistence “may unduly prejudice the rights of creditors and go well beyond what is
necessary to protect debtors and their families against the deprivation of shelter.”128
[60] However a broader policy rationale has been offered which would expand the
residential exemption beyond mere shelter. The Alberta Law Reform Institute in its 1991
Report rejected the more limited justification of shelter in favour of a broader exemption
which protects home ownership. The home ownership interest, which was said to reflect
an Alberta attitude, was to be protected “even at the expense of the creditor’s interest.”
Most Albertans, the report concluded, would consider that to deprive a debtor of a home
would be “unreasonably harsh in a manner that depriving him or her of other economic
assets would not be.”129
[61] If one accepts the contention that home ownership justifies a higher level of
exemption beyond a mere shelter provision, there are different views on what level is
required to protect home ownership.130 Furthermore, one must ask whether the relatively
low monetary limits in some jurisdictions truly act as a means of encouraging home
ownership or even preserving shelter for the family at all.131
IV

Secured creditors
A) Exemptions and Secured Creditors
[62] Although there is a strong justification that the policy of exemption law should
equally apply to secured creditors, traditionally it has not. In many jurisdictions secured
parties are able to exercise their right to seize pursuant to the terms of their security
agreement notwithstanding the existence of the provincial exemption statute.132 Ontario’s
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Execution Act, for example, reflects this traditional approach. The Execution Act only
applies to exempt chattels “from seizure under writ issued out of any court.” Thus in Re
Vanhove133 a perfected secured party was not precluded by the Execution Act from
seizing household or consumer goods.
[63] In contrast to this traditional approach, several jurisdictions take the view that a
secured party should not be able to jeopardize a debtor’s ability to maintain household
furnishings or other basic necessities particularly when the secured party did not provide
the financing to enable the debtor to acquire those goods.134 For example, Saskatchewan,
New Brunswick, PEI, and Nova Scotia all restrict the rights of secured creditors to seize
exempt property but create an exception in favour of purchase money security
interests.135 Although this might be more properly seen as an issue for Personal Property
Security law reform, exemption reform is inherently tied to secured transactions and there
is merit to including provisions which enable the debtor to rely on exemptions as against
non-purchase money secured parties. Given the lack of uniformity on this issue the
Personal Insolvency Task Force has recommended that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act be amended to avoid non-purchase money security interests in personal property that
would otherwise be exempt from seizure.136
[64] Even where a province has adopted specific exemptions that will shelter assets from
a secured creditor, such exemptions do not necessarily match the exemptions that apply
to execution creditors and anomalies exist. Provinces have not necessarily revisited the
original exemptions that apply to execution creditors to ensure that the two regimes have
been harmonized. For example, a debtor in PEI and Nova Scotia will have a $3000 motor
vehicle exemption against execution creditors and a $6500 motor vehicle exemption
against a non-purchase money secured creditor if the motor vehicle is required by the
debtor for employment.137
B) Unperfected Security Interests in Exempt Property and Bankruptcy.
[65] The different approaches to exempt property and security interests across the country
have created a flow on effect when the debtor declares bankruptcy and the secured
party’s security interest is unperfected. The problem of unperfected security interests may
commonly arise when the debtor moves a motor vehicle into a new jurisdiction.
[66] Provincial Personal Property Security legislation provides a straightforward
resolution of the conflict between an unperfected security interest and the trustee in
bankruptcy. Until perfected the security interest will not be effective against a trustee in
bankruptcy.138 A number of more complex questions arise when the debtor is bankrupt
and the secured party has an unperfected security interest in what would otherwise be
exempt from seizure and beyond the reach of the trustee in bankruptcy. At present there
is no uniform answer to this issue. Courts in Alberta, Ontario and Nova Scotia have
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analyzed this issue in three different ways owing to the lack of provincial uniformity on
exemptions.139
[67] To determine whether or not property is exempt in a bankruptcy one must consult
the relevant underlying provincial statute which gives rise to the exemption.140 Section
67(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act “incorporates by reference”141 provincial
exemption legislation. When there is a bankruptcy and an unperfected security interest it
is crucial to the outcome in each of these cases whether or not the property is exempt. If
there is no underlying exemption the trustee will be able to challenge the unperfected
security interest and prevent the creditor from seizing the asset as a secured creditor.
Even where a court finds that an asset falls within an exempt category it must still
consider whether the exemption is a right (i.e. something that exists automatically) or a
privilege which may only be asserted by a debtor, or lost altogether. There are divergent
views whether a secured party might assert the existence of such an exemption when a
debtor has waived or not claimed an exemption.142
[68] The Alberta Court of Appeal in A.C. Waring Associates Inc. v. Direct Rental Centre
(West) Ltd.143 held that the lessor was able to enforce its security interest in the exempt
property notwithstanding that its security interest was unperfected. It held that the
household furniture, namely a sofa and television, was exempt as a matter of right under
the Civil Enforcement Act and existed without a particular claim by the debtors. This
enabled the secured party to assert the existence of the exemption and prevail over the
trustee in bankruptcy. The Alberta approach has been followed in British Columbia.144
[69] In Nova Scotia and Ontario the courts reached the opposite result in that the
unperfected secured parties were unable to seize the property. Under the terms of the
Nova Scotia PPSA, a motor vehicle subject to a purchase money security interest is not
exempt. Thus in VW Credit Canada v. Roberts145 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held
that by virtue of s. 21(2) of the Nova Scotia PPSA the trustee had priority over the
unperfected secured creditor. The Court held that the trustee was entitled to the value of
the motor vehicle for distribution to all unsecured creditors.
[70] Finally, in Ontario the outcome in Re Fields146 turned on the Court of Appeal’s
conclusion that the $5000 motor vehicle exemption in the Execution Act did not exempt
any amount of an $11,000 motor vehicle. As the entire value of motor vehicle was not
exempt DaimlerChrslyer, as an unperfected secured party, was not able to pursue its
secured claim against the motor vehicle.
[71] As the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act currently defers to provincial exemption
legislation, the specific terms of the underlying provincial exemption statute will remain
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relevant to resolving this issue. More specifically the provincial determination of what is
exempt property and whether an exemption is a right or a privilege affects whether the
secured party will prevail. At present the diverse state of provincial law produces diverse
results.
V
Bankruptcy Reform: An Optional Federal List.
[72] In November 2003, the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce broadly endorsed the principle of an optional federal exemption regime for
the BIA. 147 If implemented, this recommendation would represent a fundamental shift in
Canadian bankruptcy policy from the current position of s.67(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act which incorporates provincial exemption law.
[73] The Senate Committee recommendation was largely based upon the earlier report of
the Personal Insolvency Task Force (PITF) that provided a broad outline of a proposed
federal exemption list. The optional list, according to the Report, “will ensure that all
bankrupts will have access to what is regarded as a reasonable set of exemptions
regardless of the bankrupt’s place of residence or weaknesses and gaps in the provincial
or territorial legislation.”148 A debtor would have the option of selecting either the
federal list or the relevant applicable provincial or territorial law.
[74] The list, which is set out at Appendix 12 to this report, resembles many of the
traditional categories of exempt property found in provincial law. The proposal includes
specific monetary caps for many items that are to be adjusted to the CPI. The PITF
proposal aims for more uniformity but there are aspects of the proposal that defers to
provincial law. For example, the regime seeks to establish a uniform $5000 personal
residence exemption. However, a debtor whose livelihood is derived from farming,
fishing, forestry and other activities related to the natural resource sector may be entitled
to enhanced exemptions for real and personal property. The amount of the exemption is
to be governed by the applicable provincial or territorial law but is not to be less than
$10,000 and not more than $20,000.
[75] Although the broad policy justifications for exemptions would appear to equally
apply in a bankruptcy149 there are some fundamental differences between bankruptcy and
provincial enforcement proceedings which might justify a separate federal regime.150
Traditionally, provincial law has been geared to the resolution of an individual judgment
creditor’s claim against the debtor. Judgment enforcement proceedings do not
contemplate a discharge of the debtor’s liabilities. Bankruptcy contemplates a collective
proceeding whereby the claims of all of the creditors are considered in a single forum.
Exemptions have an impact on the level of distribution to creditors as a class in
bankruptcy. Further, the end result of bankruptcy proceedings is some form of absolute
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or conditional discharge. The discharge and exempt property are inherently linked to the
larger goal of rehabilitation. Tied to the bankrupt’s fresh start after bankruptcy is whether
the debtor has been able to retain sufficient exempt assets to further the goal of
rehabilitation.151
[76] To the extent that provincial exemption law varies across the country there will be
different outcomes on the nature of the fresh start available to the debtor and the level of
distribution to creditors. Section 68 of the BIA already provides for national surplus
income guidelines which supplant provincial wage exemption laws in a bankruptcy.
Justice Iacobucci in Marzetti v. Marzetti152 confirmed that s. 68 of the BIA was designed
to “remedy province-to-province disparities in the application of the Bankruptcy Act”.153
On the issue of wages and income Iacobucci J. concluded that “Parliament no doubt
considered it unreasonable for the treatment of bankrupt persons to depend upon the
happenstance of provincial residence.”154
[77] Critics note that a federal bankruptcy exemption regime may have the effect of
triggering unwarranted bankruptcies where there is a substantial difference between
federal and provincial exemptions.155 Debtors and creditors may forum shop or elect to
be governed by the most favourable exemption regime. Where the federal limit is lower
than the local exemption law, creditors are said to have an incentive to force debtors into
bankruptcy. Conversely, where provincial exemptions are more modest than the federal
exemption standard, debtors have an incentive to make a voluntary assignment in
bankruptcy. It is argued, uniform bankruptcy exemptions would have a “disruptive
effect”156 on local collection procedures.
[78] However, such claims need to be substantiated with empirical evidence linking
bankruptcy filing rates with exemption levels.157 A multitude of factors will affect a
debtor’s decision to make an assignment in bankruptcy. Factors such as the stay of
proceedings and the discharge may well outweigh the level of exemptions.158 Current
Canadian law attempts to channel debtors away from straight bankruptcy and encourages
debtors to make proposals.
Conclusion
[79] The proposal for a Uniform Civil Enforcement Act provides an opportunity to
debate the underlying principles of exemption law. A debate that focuses only on
specific categories of property ignores larger questions of whether the traditional
justifications for exemption law that have been canvassed in this paper remain as
significant today. It is relevant to ask whether the increasing availability of consumer
credit and current levels of social welfare legislation strengthen, or weaken the case for
changes to exemption levels.
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[80] Further, provinces and territories must also consider the larger question of whether a
uniform exemption regime is possible or even desirable. The US experience illustrates
the difficulties of implementing a uniform exemption law at the state level. In 1976 the
NCCUSL approved the Uniform Exemption Act. Currently only Alaska has adopted the
Model Law as the basis for its exemption regime. Uniformity may be difficult given that
the cost of living, the stability of incomes, the level of social support, and the types of
economic activity vary across the country.159 However, the assumption that local
legislatures are more readily able to recognize local needs and interests ignores the
significant cost of living variances that exist within each province. It also ignores the
rather obvious fact that provincial law has not been kept current.160
[81] The need to accommodate local needs need not preclude the adoption of a more
uniform exemption regime. In part, the Working Group’s proposals acknowledge the
difficulty of achieving absolute uniformity as the Draft Act contemplates that
jurisdictions will differ on appropriate caps for various types of property. At the very
least, the Working Group’s proposals should persuade each province and territory to
review exemption legislation with a view to locating exemption law in a single and more
up to date exemption statute. Further, if the federal government proceeds to implement an
optional federal exemption regime it would do well to consider the more detailed
proposals found in the ULCC Draft Act. The ULCC would also benefit by examining
some of the alternative ways of achieving uniformity proposed by the PITF.
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